Applying a “historical institutionalist” approach, the author argues that the particular institutional character of the military in the countries studied, more so than external factors or domestic politics, largely determined the nature and outcome of transition to civilian rule.Seeks to explain why the military rulers in Latin America adopted particular economic policies; discusses policy choices, appointments to government posts of economists favoring neoliberal policies, policy formulation, privatization, and the role of ideas and ideology under military governments in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. The Argentine case was important as an inspiration of the concept, but the concept was then applied by many authors to other military governments.Remmer, a political scientist, analyzes the origins and political and economic consequences of military rule, and she compares and contrasts the policies of military governments and civilian regimes. Likewise, the closely related topics of guerrilla movements during this period, human rights violations under the military governments, US policy and support for many of the military governments, and the transitions back to civilian government (including “transitional justice”) are not covered in depth, but some of the selections do treat these topics and direct the reader to a more extensive literature on these subjects. The sources discussed in this article reflect that diversity.The literature on military governments in Latin America from 1959 to 1990 sought to differentiate these regimes from the military governments that periodically and recurrently took power in the region before the Cuban Revolution. Military governments, though inevitably authoritarian, implemented varying economic, social, and foreign policies. This excludes personalist dictatorships, party dictatorships, and civilian governments in which the armed forces exercised considerable influence but did not rule directly. Creates a typology of military regimes often cited in the literature. Relies heavily on official military journals in Latin America, Canada, Asia, and Europe.Presents an Argentine political scientist’s formulation of the concept of “bureaucratic-authoritarian” regimes, which became widely applied to Latin American military governments—as well as the subject of extensive theoretical debate—and then a reconsideration of the concept by O’Donnell himself.

How did repressive military regimes increase Latin American dependence on industrialized nations? Special attention given to Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. Part 2 of the book focuses on the Chilean case.Historical treatment of the armed forces in Latin America by an outstanding French expert; chapters 8–11 focus on the 1959–1990 period.

The term is a portmanteau word combining kakistocracy with khaki, the tan-green camouflage colour used in most modern army uniforms. Differs in interpretation regarding the extent of US control over Operation Condor with Comparative study of the role and consequences of professional militarism in Latin America from 1964 to 1989 by one of most prominent experts on Latin American military institutions. The article is limited to those cases in which military governments or “civil-military” governments were in power. Widely cited in Latin America in translation (Stepan, Alfred. Long-term military governments, with changing leadership in most cases, controlled eleven Latin American nations for significant periods from 1964 to 1990: Ecuador, 1963–1966 and 1972–1978; Guatemala, 1963–1985 (with an interlude from 1966–1969); Brazil, 1964–1985; Bolivia, 1964–1970 and 1971–1982; Argentina, 1966–1973 and 1976–1983; Peru, 1968–1980; Panama, …

These regimes also encouraged multinational corporations (companies with divisions in more than two countries) to come to Latin America.